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INCOMPLETE AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN 
SERVICES: CAUSES AND PROBLEMS—APPLYING 
INCOMPLETE CONTRACT THEORY 
Tae Jung Park* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The negotiations on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)–Japan 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“AJCEP”) Agreement commenced in April 2005 
and, after eleven rounds of negotiations, were substantially concluded in November 2007.1 
Japan and the ten ASEAN countries (Brunei, Burma [Myanmar], Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) negotiated for three 
years before finally concluding the regional trade agreement. However, the agreed-upon 
trade in services (“TIS”) agreement consists of only one article: a renegotiation clause. 
Thus, after three years of negotiation, the ASEAN countries and Japan made no progress 
but to agree to renegotiate. 
Japan and the ASEAN countries are not the only countries that failed to complete an 
agreement on TIS.2 In fact, many incomplete TIS agreements are concluded each year. For 
instance, India and China have repeatedly concluded agreements with numerous 
incomplete provisions.3 Similarly, various Latin American countries have failed to 
                                                          
*A legal advisor in the international legal affairs division in the Ministry of Justice and a formal investment and 
services treaty negotiator in the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy in South Korea. Currently a SJD 
candidate (University of Virginia School of Law), LLM (Northwestern University School of Law), JD (Case 
Western Reserve Law), MA in International and Development Economics (Yale University), and BA in 
Economics (Cornell University). I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Paul Stephan, my SJD 
supervisor. He taught me how to write a good paper and become a good legal scholar. I would also like to thank 
Michael Gilbert for his valuable comments and suggestions. Without him, I would never have been able to write 
this Article. The views or opinions expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views or opinions 
of the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy in South Korea. All remaining errors and 
misconceptions are entirely my responsibility 
 1. The Eleventh Round of Negotiations on the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF JAPAN, (Nov. 2, 2007), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2007/11/1176091_860.html [hereinafter Eleventh Round of Negotiations 
on the AJCEP]. 
 2. “Trade in services” agreements are regional or plurilateral agreements that, like their “trade in goods 
agreement” counterparts, establish international commerce “rules aimed at promoting fair and open trade across 
the full spectrum of service sectors.” Trade in Services Agreement, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/TiSA (last visited Aug. 31, 2017). The 1995 World Trade Organization General Agreement on 
Trade in Services is the foundation upon which regional and plurilateral TIS agreements are based. Countries 
negotiate TIS agreements in order to “develop[] . . . strong, transparent, and effective regulatory policies, which 
are so important to enabling international commerce.” Id.  
 3. AUSTRALIAN DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, CHINA-AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
(CHAFTA): SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS AND ANNEXES, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/fact-
sheets/Documents/chafta-summary-of-chapters-and-annexes.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2017). 
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complete their TIS agreements, New Zealand recently concluded an incomplete agreement 
with China,4 and the European Union ratified another incomplete agreement with Mexico.5 
Why do countries fail to complete agreements on TIS? Why do they break their 
promises to renegotiate and postpone the correction of incomplete treaties? Academic 
research has never focused on why countries such as Japan and members of ASEAN ratify 
incomplete TIS agreements or why countries fail to comply with renegotiation clauses to 
correct incomplete agreements. This Article employs incomplete contract theory to explain 
these phenomena and suggest a solution to this problem.6 
An incomplete contract assumes that both contracting parties lack complete 
knowledge of the world and thus face future uncertainties and risks. This differs from 
hypothetical and imaginary contracts, which are perfect complete contracts.7 A perfect 
complete contract assumes contracting parties have complete knowledge of the world. 
Thus, risks and obligations can be assigned to parties without any problems or costs. 
Parties would have no reason to insert missing or incomplete articles, because they would 
have complete knowledge of when, how, and why countries would discriminate against 
foreign suppliers of services in the future. The parties could easily agree on the details of 
most-favored-nation (“MFN”) status or national treatment (“NT”) articles included in the 
agreement. Nevertheless, a perfect complete contract exists only in theory—in practice, 
parties always deal with incomplete contracts full of uncertainties and risks. 
In this regard, parties can also view the incomplete investment treaty as an 
incomplete contract. This Article draws on incomplete contract theory to identify reasons 
parties include incomplete provisions and the problems associated with these provisions. 
Section II lays out examples of the puzzle in the agreement in TIS: incomplete provisions 
in the main text and a reservation list. Section III applies the incomplete contract theory to 
address the causes and problems of incomplete provisions in the agreements. Section VI 
concludes the Article. 
II. INCOMPLETE PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
This section illustrates the various ways in which negotiating partners fail to 
complete TIS agreements. First, this section classifies two types of incomplete provisions 
in the main text of many TIS agreements: missing text and unfinished articles. Missing 
text occurs when negotiating partners fail to agree on any articles and leave the text blank. 
Unfinished articles appear when the parties partly complete the main text but decide to 
fully complete the text during a renegotiation phase. 
Second, this section briefly discusses the two different reservation-scheduling 
                                                          
 4. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China, China-N.Z., N.Z. DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-
agreements-in-force/China-FTA/NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf [hereinafter NZCFTA].  
 5. Decision 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 Feb. 2001, Implementing Articles 6, 9, 12(2)(b) 
and 50 of the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, 2001 O.J. (L 70) 7 
[hereinafter Decision 2/2001].  
 6. For incomplete contract theory in the legal studies, see Richard Craswell, The “Incomplete Contracts” 
Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151, 151 (2005); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. 
STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2006); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 187, 187 (2005). 
 7. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (Denise Clinton et al. eds., 5th ed. 2008). 
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approaches, namely a positive8 and a negative list approach, 9 and then classifies two types 
of incomplete provisions that regularly appear under each approach: 1) missing schedules 
of commitments or nonconforming measure and 2) unfinished schedules of commitments 
or nonconforming measures.  
Missing schedules or nonconforming measures appear when the parties fail to add 
any schedules of commitments or lists of nonconforming measures and simply insert 
clauses to renegotiate this at a later time. Unfinished schedules or nonconforming 
measures occur when the parties partly complete the schedules or nonconforming 
measures and decide to fully complete these aspects of the agreement afterward. 
Lastly, this section introduces two types of renegotiation clauses: 1) one with less 
stringent requirements and 2) one with more stringent requirements. Renegotiation clauses 
with less stringent requirements do not impose strong legal obligations on the parties to 
renegotiate. For instance, such clauses simply state that parties “shall endeavor” to 
renegotiate the text. In contrast, renegotiation clauses with more stringent requirements 
use stronger legal terms, such as “shall enter” into the renegotiation, and set beginning and 
concluding deadlines to strengthen the parties’ commitment to renegotiating the text. 
Sometimes the clause specifically assigns renegotiation agendas to avoid unnecessary 
debate. 
A. Incomplete Provisions 
1. Incomplete Text 
a. Missing Text 
Missing text problems occur when negotiating partners agree to leave the main text 
of TIS agreements blank. That is, they spend years negotiating, only to omit all clauses 
related to substantive obligations from the main text. Instead, they simply include a clause 
to renegotiate the content later. The AJCEP provides a good example of this: 
Chapter 6  Trade in Services 
Article 50  Trade in Services 
1. Each Party shall endeavour to, in accordance with its laws, regulations and 
policies, take further steps towards the expansion of trade in services among or 
between the Parties consistent with [the General Agreement on Trade in Services]. 
2. The Parties shall, with the participation of Japan and all ASEAN Member 
States, continue to discuss and negotiate provisions for trade in services with a view 
to exploring measures towards further liberalisation and facilitation of trade in 
services among Japan and ASEAN Member States and to enhance cooperation in 
                                                          
 8. See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SERVICES AND INVESTMENT IN EU TRADE DEALS: USING 
‘POSITIVE’ AND ‘NEGATIVE’ LISTS (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154427.pdf. 
The positive listing recognizes four “modes” of trading in services: 1) across the border (e.g., the internet); 2) 
consumption abroad (e.g., a tourist); 3) establishing a commercial presence (foreign direct investment); and 4) 
the temporary presence of a natural person to deliver a service. Id. Governments can make different levels of 
commitment for each mode in relation to each of the market access and national treatment rules. Id. 
 9. Id. Under the negative listing the main features of the non-conforming measures must be specified in 
detail. These measures include the following elements: 1) the economic sector in which the reservation is taken; 
2) the specific industry in which the reservation is taken; 3) the activity covered by the reservation; 4) the 
substantial or procedural obligation under which a reservation is taken (e.g., MFN or national treatment); and 5) 
a description of the specific law, regulation, or other measure for which the reservation is taken. Id.  
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order to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of services and service 
suppliers of Japan and the ASEAN Member States. For this purpose, a Sub-
Committee on Trade in Services, which shall be composed of representatives of the 
Governments of Japan and all ASEAN Member States, shall be established in 
accordance with Article 11 within one (1) year from the date of entry into force of 
this Agreement pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 79. 
3. The results of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 2, if any, shall be 
incorporated into this Chapter in accordance with Article 77.10 
ASEAN and Japan decided to include only a single renegotiation clause, Article 50. 
This renegotiation clause is the only article in the chapter related to TIS. As described in 
the second paragraph of the article, both negotiating partners have a legal obligation to 
continue their negotiations to complete the agreement, and the negotiation should be held 
within one year of the date of entry into force of the AJCEP. That is, both negotiating 
partners should initiate the renegotiation within one year of the ratification of the AJCEP. 
Once the parties agree to complete Article 50, the agreed-upon text will be incorporated 
into the chapter, as indicated in paragraph 3. 
The “negotiations . . . commenced in April 2005, . . . and after eleven rounds of 
negotiation,” both partners signed the AJCEP on April 14, 2008.11 The eleven rounds of 
negotiation produced nothing more than a consensus to continue the negotiations at a later 
date. Due to the missing text, the AJCEP TIS agreement is incomplete. 
b. Unfinished Articles 
The unfinished articles problem occurs when both negotiating partners successfully 
agree upon most of the text but fail to complete certain parts of an article or the text. The 
chapter on TIS in the Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) between New Zealand and China 
(the “NZCFTA”) is a good example of this: 
Article 124 Review 
The Parties shall consult within 2 years of entry into force of this Agreement and 
at least every 3 years thereafter, or as otherwise agreed, to review the 
implementation of this Chapter and consider other trade in services issues of mutual 
interest, including the extension of most-favoured-nation treatment to additional 
services sectors not listed in Annex 9, with a view to the progressive liberalisation 
of the trade in services between them on a mutually advantageous basis. 12 
This article imposes an obligation on both New Zealand and China to renegotiate 
Annex 9, which lists the MFN coverage sectors—that is, the sectors that will be affected 
by MFN status.13 Currently, the annex lists only nine economic sectors, such as the 
environmental and construction sectors. Thus, New Zealand and China agreed to commit 
                                                          
 10. Eleventh Round of Negotiations on the AJCEP, supra note 1. 
 11. MALAY. MINISTRY OF INT’L TRADE & INDUS., ASEAN–Japan: Background, MALAYSIA’S FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS, http://fta.miti.gov.my/index.php/pages/view/asean-japan (last visited Aug. 27, 2017). 
 12. NZCFTA, supra note 4. 
 13. “Most-favoured-nation” provisions in TIS agreements secure “trade without discrimination” by requiring 
all countries treat their trading partners equally. “In general, MFN means that every time a country lowers a trade 
barrier or opens up a market [for one country], it has to do so for the same goods or services from all its trading 
partners.” In international agreements, the concept of MFN status is so important that it occupies the second 
article of the General Agreement on Trade in Services. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 11 
(2005), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_text_e.pdf.   
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only nine economic sectors for MFN coverage. As indicated in Article 124, both parties 
recognized the incomplete nature of the list and therefore agreed to expand it by initiating 
renegotiations within two years of the ratification of the NZCFTA and agreeing to continue 
the discussion at least every three years thereafter. Due to Article 124 being unfinished, 
the NZCFTA TIS agreement is incomplete. 
B. Incomplete Schedules of Commitments or Nonconforming Measures 
Incomplete provisions may also be classified based upon which reservation-
scheduling approach the countries utilize for their TIS agreement. “To slightly simplify 
international trade agreements, there are two basic ways in which countries make 
liberalizing concessions.”14 Under the positive list approach, “countries specifically list 
which products or services they agree to lower tariffs on (or decrease non-tariff barriers 
on).”15 Under the negative list approach, “countries specifically list which products or 
services they will maintain trade barriers on.”16 Either approach can result in an incomplete 
TIS agreement, as discussed below. 
1. Under Positive List Approach 
a. Missing Schedules of Commitments 
Under the positive list approach, countries frequently fail to complete the schedule 
of commitments, which lists the specific economic sectors bound by TIS obligations, and 
instead simply include a renegotiation clause. That is, the parties agree to ratify the TIS 
agreement without explaining what economic sectors are bound by the agreement. The 
TIS agreement in the European Union–Mexico FTA is a good example of this: 
Article 7 Trade liberalisation 
As provided for in paragraphs 2 to 4, the Parties shall liberalise trade in services 
between themselves, in conformity with Article V of [General Agreement on Trade 
in Services]. 
From the entry into force of this Decision, neither Party shall adopt new, or more, 
discriminatory measures as regards services or service suppliers of the other Party, 
in comparison with the treatment accorded to its own like services or service 
suppliers. 
1. No later than three years following the entry into force of this Decision, the 
Joint Council shall adopt a decision providing for the elimination of substantially 
all remaining discrimination between the Parties in the sectors and modes of supply 
covered by this Chapter1. That decision shall contain: 
 (a).   A list of commitments establishing the level of liberalisation which the 
 Parties agree to grant each other at the end of a transitional period of ten years 
 from the entry into force of this Decision. 
 (b).   A liberalisation calendar for each Party in order to reach at the end of the 
                                                          
 14. Daniel O’Connor, When a Negative Is a Positive: Updating International Trade Agreements for the 21st 
Century, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (July 6, 2012), http://www.project-disco.org/information-
flow/when-a-negative-is-positive-updating-international-trade-agreements-for-the-21st-
century/#.WajRXrKGO70. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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 ten-year transitional period the level of liberalisation described in subparagraph 
 (a). 
Except as provided in paragraph 2, Article 4, 5 and 6 shall become applicable in 
accordance with the calendar and subject to any reservations stipulated in the 
Parties’ lists of commitments provided for in paragraph 3.The Joint Council may 
amend the liberalisation calendar and the list of commitments established in 
accordance with paragraph 3, with a view to remove or add exceptions. 17 
The European Union and Mexico successfully agreed on all the substantive 
obligation clauses such as MFN and NT,18 yet failed to reach consensus on inserting a 
schedule of commitments for both countries. Instead, they decided to renegotiate the 
schedule after the ratification of the treaty. Both parties agreed to initiate the renegotiation 
no later than three years following ratification, and the joint councils of both countries 
would adopt a decision containing a schedule of commitments as the renegotiation 
proceeded. Because of the missing schedules, both negotiating partners may not 
understand which economic sectors are bound by the substantive obligations in the main 
text. 
b. Unfinished Schedules of Commitments 
Unfinished schedules of commitments occur when both countries fail to fully 
complete the schedules of commitments before the conclusion of negotiations. During the 
negotiation period, both may agree to draft and exchange schedules of commitments, but 
they fail to agree on most of the economic sectors. Thus, the countries agree to open their 
markets only to a few economic sectors. 
The Australia–Thailand FTA (the “ATFTA”) is a good example of this: 
Article 812 Review of Commitments 
In pursuance of the objectives of this Chapter, the Parties shall enter into further 
negotiations on trade in services within three years from the date of entry into force 
of this Agreement with the aim of enhancing the overall commitments undertaken 
by the Parties under this Agreement. 
In negotiating further commitments in accordance with this Article, the Parties shall 
recognise the provisions of Article V (1) and (3) of [General Agreement in Trade 
in Services]. 
If, after this Agreement enters into force, a Party enters into any agreement on trade 
in services with a non-Party, it shall consider a request by the other Party for the 
incorporation in this Agreement of treatment no less favourable than that provided 
under the former agreement. 
If, after this Agreement enters into force, a Party further liberalises any of its 
services sectors, sub-sectors or activities, it shall consider a request by the other 
Party for the incorporation in this Agreement of the unilateral liberalisation. 
If, after this Agreement enters into force, a service previously supplied in the 
exercise of governmental authority is subsequently supplied on a commercial basis 
                                                          
 17. Decision 2/2001, supra note 5. 
 18. Like MFN, “national treatment” provisions are designed to secure fair, non-discriminatory trade 
conditions. National treatment requires countries “treat[] foreigners and locals equally.” In other words, when 
countries agree to national treatment, they agree that “the same regulations . . . apply to foreign suppliers as to 
nationals,” subject to any exceptions in the TIS agreement. See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 13, at 11, 38. 
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or in competition with one or more service suppliers, the Party concerned shall 
consider a request by the other Party for the incorporation in this Agreement of new 
commitments relating to that service. 19 
As stated in paragraph 1 of Article 812, both countries agreed to renegotiate in order 
to enhance the overall schedule of commitments. Thailand’s schedule of commitments 
covers only nine economic sectors. To correct the incomplete schedules, the countries 
agreed to initiate the renegotiation within three years of ratification of the treaty. During 
the renegotiation, Thailand would gradually complete the schedule and decide whether it 
will open the market to the rest of the economic sectors. Upon Australia’s request, more 
complete schedules would be incorporated into the original ratified agreement, as indicated 
in paragraph 4. 
2. Under Negative List Approach 
a. Missing Nonconforming Measures 
Under the negative list approach, missing nonconforming measures issues arise 
when countries decide to exclude the nonconforming measures list from the text. “A non-
conforming measure is any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice” which 
exists at the time of negotiation and does not conform to the obligations of the TIS 
agreement.20 Nonconforming measures are exceptions to the TIS agreement. However, 
countries frequently ratify their TIS agreement without listing the nonconforming 
measures—the exceptions—to the treaty. The following example is from the ASEAN–
Korea FTA (the “AKFTA”): 
Article 27 Work Programme 
1. Parties shall enter into discussions on: 
 (a) Article 4 (Most-[Favored]-Nation Treatment); 
 (b) TRIMS-Plus elements to Article 6 (Performance Requirements); 
 (c) Schedules of Reservations to this Agreement; 
 (d) Procedures for modification of Schedules of Reservations that will apply at 
 the date of entry into force of the Schedules of Reservations to this Agreement; 
 [. . .] 
2. The Parties shall conclude the discussion referred to in paragraph 1, within five 
years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement unless the Parties 
otherwise agree. These discussions shall be overseen by the Implementing 
Committee established under Article 5.3 of the Framework Agreement. 
3. Schedules of Reservations to this Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
enter into force on a date agreed to by the Parties.21 
As paragraph 1 (c) and (d) states, Korea and ASEAN countries agreed to renegotiate 
                                                          
 19. Australia-Thailand Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Thai., July 5, 2004, Austl. Gov’t Dep’t Foreign Aff. & 
Trade, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tafta/fta-text-and-implementation/Documents/aus-
thai_FTA_text.pdf. 
 20. Nonconforming Measures, SICE DICTIONARY OF TRADE TERMS, 
http://www.sice.oas.org/dictionary/IN_e.asp (last visited Aug. 27, 2017). 
 21. Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Among the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the 
Republic of Korea, June 2, 2009, ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area, 
http://akfta.asean.org/uploads/docs/agreements/Investment-Full.pdf. 
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the reservation list (i.e., nonconforming measures under the negative list approach), as well 
as the procedures for modifying the reservation list. As indicated in paragraph 2, the 
countries agreed to complete the renegotiation within five years of ratification of the treaty.  
b. Unfinished Nonconforming Measures 
The problem of unfinished nonconforming measures arises when negotiating 
partners agree to include an incomplete version of the reservation list. That is, they add 
their domestic measures and their descriptions to the nonconforming measures list, but the 
list lacks specificity and detailed information of the domestic measures. The Japan–
Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (the “JSEPA”) is a good example of this: 
Matter: privatization 
Legal source or authority: N/A 
Relevant obligation: National Treatment (Article 73), Prohibition of Performance 
requirements (Article 75) 
Description: National treatment and prohibition of performance requirement shall 
not apply to the privatization or divestment of assets owned by government.22 
The above is Singapore’s nonconforming measure in the area of privatization, which 
lacks details regarding the legal source or authority. As the description indicates, the 
Singaporean government wanted to carve out their domestic policies related to 
privatization in a certain sector. However, because the legal source is missing, readers of 
the treaty have no way to determine which economic sectors allow privatization. The plain 
language approach tells us that Singapore carved out all the privatization related laws and 
policies, but it is unclear whether this is what the Singaporean government intended. 
C. Renegotiation Clause: Response to the Incomplete Provisions 
1. Renegotiation Clause with Less Strict Requirements 
Even if the negotiating partners recognize the necessity to renegotiate the incomplete 
provisions, they sometimes include a renegotiation clause with less strict requirements to 
avoid strong legal obligations to renegotiate the treaty. The following example appears in 
the India–Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (the “ISCECA”). 
ARTICLE 7.9: PROGRESSIVE [LIBERALISATION] 
The Parties shall endeavour to review their schedules of specific commitments at 
least once every three years, or earlier, at the request of either Party, with a view to 
facilitating the elimination of substantially all remaining discrimination between 
the Parties with regard to trade in Services covered in this Chapter over a period of 
time. In this process, there shall be due respect for the national policy objectives 
and the level of development of the Parties, both overall and in individual sectors.23 
Here, India and Singapore agreed to use a renegotiation clause to correct the 
                                                          
 22. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF JAPAN, ANNEX V-B: LIST OF EXCEPTIONS IN THE AREA OF INVESTMENT 
(SINGAPORE) 556–57, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/singapore/jsepa-6-2.pdf.  
 23. Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Republic of 
Singapore, India-Sing., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2707 [hereinafter ISCECA].  
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unfinished schedules of commitments.24 They agreed to use the term “shall endeavor” to 
renegotiate the schedules, and this term imposes upon both governments the obligation to 
do their best to renegotiate without any strong legal obligations. The text does not specify 
what level of effort is required, but simply states that both parties should do their best to 
complete their unfinished schedules of commitments. There is no way for the other 
negotiating partner to establish whether the party in fact did its best to correct the schedule 
to enhance the level of liberalization and market openings. Moreover, there is no way to 
sanction the party if it failed to do so. 
2. Renegotiation Clause with More Strict Requirements 
The parties could fully commit themselves by inserting terms that require strong 
obligations to correct the incomplete provisions problems. They could use the term “shall” 
and establish a review mechanism to regularly follow up with a procedure for specifying 
the incomplete provisions. The following is an example of a trilateral investment 
agreement between ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand (hereinafter the “AANZFTA”): 
Article 6 Review of Commitments 
The Parties shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later 
than three years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and periodically 
thereafter as determined by the FTA Joint Committee, with a view to further 
improving specific commitments under this Chapter so as to progressively 
liberalise trade in services among the Parties. . . . 
Article 24 Committee on Trade in Services 
1. The Parties hereby establish a Committee on Trade in Services (Services 
Committee), consisting of representatives of the Parties. 
2. The Services Committee’s functions shall be: 
(a) to conduct reviews of commitments in accordance with Article 6 (Review of 
Commitments); 
(b) if the multilateral negotiations referred to in Article 19.1 (Safeguard Measures) 
have not concluded within three years from entry into force of this Agreement, to 
enter into discussion on the question of emergency safeguard measures based on 
the principle of non-discrimination for the purpose of considering appropriate 
amendments to this Chapter; 
(c) to enter into discussions on the application of most-favoured-nation treatment 
to trade in services for the purpose of considering appropriate amendments to this 
Chapter, in conjunction with the first review of commitments under Article 6 
(Review of Commitments); 
(d)  to review the implementation of this Chapter; 
(e)  to consider any other matters identified by the Parties; and 
(f)  to report to the FTA Joint Committee as required. 
3. The Services Committee shall conclude the discussions referred to in Paragraph 
2(a) to (c) within five years of entry into force of this Agreement, unless the Parties 
agree otherwise. 
4. The Services Committee shall meet as mutually determined by the Parties as 
required under this Article and Article 6 (Review of Commitments). Meetings may 
be conducted in person, or by any other means as mutually determined by the 
                                                          
 24. Id. 
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Parties.25 
Unlike India and Singapore, Australia, ASEAN, and New Zealand were fully 
committed to fixing the incomplete provisions problems, as evidenced by their use of terms 
that impose strong legal obligations and creation of a monitoring mechanism. First, they 
used the term “shall enter into” instead of “shall endeavor.”26 This requires the three 
countries start and finish the renegotiations within five years of the date of ratification. 
Otherwise, it would be a violation of international law. Moreover, they successfully set up 
a monitoring device, the Committee on Trade in Services, through Article 24.27 Article 24 
specifies when to meet first and what to do for the incomplete provisions.28 The parties are 
obligated to initiate renegotiation of the incomplete provisions within three years of 
ratification of the treaty.29 Moreover, as indicated in paragraph 3, the parties set a deadline 
of five years after ratification of the treaty to finalize a completed version of the 
agreement.30 This is quite different from previous examples of the renegotiation clause in 
the India-Singapore CECA because it requires active participation for correcting the 
incomplete provision problems. 
III. APPLYING INCOMPLETE CONTRACT THEORY: CAUSES OF, PROBLEMS RELATED TO, 
AND SOLUTIONS TO INCOMPLETE PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN 
SERVICES 
So far, this Article illustrated some examples of the recurring enigma of many 
agreements on trade in services: the incompleteness in both the main text and the schedules 
of commitments. This part of the Article draws on incomplete contract theory to explain 
why negotiators leave the provisions incomplete. After highlighting the problems 
associated with incompleteness, this Article provides a solution to the problem. 
A. Overview of Incomplete Contract Theory 
1. Transaction Cost and Incomplete Contract 
Coase pioneered the concept of transaction costs.31 Coase’s work challenges the 
neoclassical assumptions of complete information and costless exchanges in contractual 
arrangements. He argues that a market transaction requires different costs to be considered, 
including the searching cost and the negotiation cost.32 He indicates that if transaction costs 
                                                          
 25. The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement was executed on February 27, 2009 and 
entered into force on January 1, 2010 for Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapor, Vietnam, 
Australia, and New Zealand; March 12, 2010 for Thailand; January 1, 2011 for Laos; January 4, 2011 for 
Cambodia; and January 10, 2012 for Indonesia. Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand 
Free Trade Area, ASEAN-Austl.-N.Z., Thai. Free Trade Area Dep’t Trade Negots. 104–05, 
http://www.thaifta.com/Engfta/Portals/0/AANZFTA.pdf [hereinafter AANZFTA].  
 26. Id. at 89; ISCECA, supra note 23. 
 27. AANZFTA, supra note 25. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 32. Ronald H. Coase, The Problems of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). Coase argues that the costs 
inure to transactions. “In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one 
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading 
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were considered, many contractual arrangements would not be made.33 
Williamson subsequently refined the concept of transaction costs.34 According to 
him, transaction costs are the costs of negotiating a contract ex ante and monitoring it ex 
post as opposed to the production costs, which are the costs of enacting the contract.35 This 
view is accepted by many economists, and now the concept of transaction costs 
encompasses all of the impediments to bargaining. The view has three forms: 1) search 
cost, 2) bargaining cost, and 3) enforcement cost.36 Search cost is required for deciding 
whether one’s preferred goods or negotiating partners are available on the market. 
Bargaining cost is a cost that requires one to complete an acceptable agreement with the 
other negotiating partners to the transaction. The negotiation and legal skills for drafting 
an agreement could be an example of the bargaining cost. Enforcement cost is the cost of 
ensuring that the other negotiating partners stick to the terms of the agreement. In general, 
enforcement cost is low when violations of the agreement are easy to observe and 
punishment is cheap to administer. 
What if a transaction cost is zero and both contracting parties enjoy perfect 
information of the world? Then we can expect a perfect and complete contract. Every 
contingency is anticipated; the associated risks are efficiently allocated between the parties 
because all relevant information has been communicated. A perfect contract is also 
efficient. Each resource is allocated to the party that values it the most and each risk is 
allocated to the party that bears risk with the least cost. The contract would perfectly assign 
risks and obligations in every state. A zero-bargaining cost would make it easier for both 
contracting parties to agree on any special circumstances. Opportunism is not a problem. 
Opportunistic behavior tends not to arise in the complete contract because even if it arises, 
both parties will have inserted the terms in the contract to prevent and punish such 
opportunistic behavior. 
In reality, however, there is no perfect and complete contract because the transaction 
cost cannot possibly be zero and there is no way for the parties to foresee every possible 
scenario that will arise in the future. A contract always requires a cost of finding the right 
contracting partners, the right drafting skills, et cetera. In fact, a contract will always be 
incomplete in the sense that the parties will fail to include all the variables that are 
potentially relevant to it.37 
Because of the difficulty of predicting and evaluating all the variables, the parties 
face a risk. A risk of a natural disaster is a good example of this. To respond to risk, the 
parties do their best to allocate the risks that can arise. For example, the contract may 
stipulate that the completion date will be deferred in the event of a natural disaster. 
However, in many cases, the contract may say nothing about who bears the risk. When the 
                                                          
up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the 
contract are being observed, and so on.” Id.  
 33. RONALD H. COASE, NOTES ON THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL COSTS, IN THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE 
LAW 157–58 (1988). 
 34. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15–32 (1985). 
 35. Id. at 21. 
 36. Carl Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979) (“[A] transaction cost 
[includes]: 1) search and information cost; 2) bargaining and decisions costs; and 3) policing and enforcement 
costs.”). 
 37. SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 76. 
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contract remains silent about a risk, the contract has a gap. Why do parties decide to omit 
something about a certain condition by leaving a gap in a contract? Of the various reasons 
for leaving a gap, the most important one is related to the effort and costs of anticipating 
possible contingencies, bargaining about their solution, and then describing them 
adequately.38 In particular, parties will tend not to specify terms and to leave a gap in 
relation to low probability events because the expected loss from the gap will be minimal, 
whereas the cost of including the terms would be significant. For instance, it may take only 
a minute to discuss and agree on a term about what to do if a lawyer is involved in a car 
accident on the way to signing a deal, but if such an event is unlikely to occur, it would 
not be worthwhile to include a provision for such an outcome in the contract. To express 
this as an equation, suppose the cost of including a term for an (anticipated) contingency 
is C, that the likelihood of the contingency is P, and that the loss that the parties would 
jointly suffer by failing to include a term for the contingency is L. The following equation 
would apply: 
Leave a gap → Expected loss of PL < C 
Fill the gap → Expected loss of PL > C 
2. Problems of Incomplete Contract – Opportunistic Behavior 
The incomplete contract always suffers from opportunism problems. In other words, 
the gap may encourage contracting parties to engage in opportunistic behavior.39 The 
incomplete contract theory explains that when a party has the flexibility to adjust its 
performance in the future as conditions change, the party will always choose the best 
alternative option for itself, even though the option may not be the best for both negotiating 
parties.40 One party may have private knowledge of the occurrence of a contingency at 
hand, which it can strategically withhold. Suppose a seller and a buyer agreed to include a 
warranty provision in the contract that obligated the seller to do their utmost to fix a 
machine. Both parties would leave a gap with respect to an obligation when the cost of 
fixing the machine arises because it would have been impossible for the parties to foresee 
the increase in the cost of the nuts and bolts required to fix the machine. If the cost of 
fixing the machine actually rises, the seller might have an economic incentive not to fix 
the machine and still argue that he or she did their best to fix it. The seller is the one who 
knows about the level of his or her efforts, and therefore is likely to abuse the information 
that is only known to him or her. 
                                                          
 38. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 299 (2004) (providing several 
reasons for the incompleteness of contracts such as the cost of enforcing a contractual term and difficulties 
verifying contingencies or variables); SIMON A.B. SCHROPP, TRADE POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND ENFORCEMENT 
IN THE WTO: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 74 (2014) (classifying two types of gaps: inadvertent gaps and 
foreseeable gaps). 
 39. William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics and the 
Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 996, 1008 (1996). 
 40. SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 76; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) (recognizing the possibility that 
one party might strategically withhold information that would increase the total gains from contracting in order 
to increase her private share of the gains from contracting). 
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3. The Application of Incomplete Contract Theory to International Law 
Incomplete contract theory has recently been applied to international law.41 It is the 
application of economic incomplete contract theory, assuming that states are rational 
actors when they conclude the international agreements. Schropp applied the incomplete 
contract theory to the WTO system to seek various trade policy flexibility mechanisms. 
Recently, Van Aaken took a first step in applying the incomplete contract theory in 
the field of international investment law.42 She argues that a soft term or gap should be 
inserted in an international investment agreement because inserting a hard term, which is 
less open to interpretation, will always turn out to be suboptimal in the future.43 Once 
conditions change, a contract with a hard term will lead to outcomes that are less desirable 
than the parties would have agreed upon had they known of the uncertainties in advance. 
Accordingly, Van Aaken argues that gaps such as escape or exception clauses should be 
inserted to compensate for an unpredictable future. Alschner is another researcher who 
recently recognized an international investment agreement as an incomplete contract.44 He 
observes that first generation investment treaties are highly incomplete contracts 
containing only brief and vague provisions and delegating much of the gap-filling to 
tribunals, whereas the degree of incompleteness in the second-generation investment 
treaties is considerably lower. He argues that the second-generation investment treaties 
should assist arbitral gap-filling in first generation treaties. 
However, despite the excessive number of TIS agreements ratified with incomplete 
provisions, the literature never touched on describing the incompleteness problems in 
these agreements. Thus, in the section that follows, the Article examines why TIS 
agreements contain many incomplete provisions and the problems associated with those 
provisions. Subsequently, the Article proposes a practical solution by employing 
incomplete contract theory. 
B. Why Have Incomplete Provisions in an Agreement on Trade in Services? 
The incomplete provisions are, in fact, gaps in the incomplete contract theory. Many 
nations spend years in negotiations and decide to leave a gap by not specifying the terms 
or not putting anything in the text. Why do both parties leave gaps? As noted, in order for 
a gap to be efficient, the following equation should be established: A gap should be left 
when the expected loss of PL is less than C (PL<C). That is, the cost of filling out the gaps 
should be greater than the probability of the loss multiplied by the loss that the parties 
                                                          
 41. See generally Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 348–54 (1989); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis 
of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1999); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Anne Van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘The Limits 
of International Law’, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289 (2006); ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: 
A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2008); ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013). 
 42. Anne Van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract 
Theory, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 507 (2009) (arguing that contract theory could be utilized in international 
investment law similar to how its used in international trade law).  
 43. Id. 
 44. Wolfgang Alschner, Interpreting Investment Treaties as Incomplete Contracts: Lesson from Contract 
Theory (July 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2241652.  
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would jointly suffer from failing to include the terms. 
When negotiating partners leave a gap either in the text or the schedule of 
commitments, both of them presumably believe that the cost of including the terms would 
outweigh the joint loss incurred from not including the terms, considering the probability 
of the loss. It is not always true that the cost of filling the term (C) is much higher than the 
possible joint loss (PL) from having the gap. In fact, the equation still holds if the joint 
loss (L) is higher than the cost of filling the terms (C) when the probability of joint loss 
(P) is extremely small. There are different types of cases where the equation justifies 
leaving gaps. It would be difficult to discover all the variables that would fit into the 
equation, but this Article seeks to examine some possible factors that constitute 
determining P, L, and C. 
What would constitute the cost of filling the term (C)? The high cost of filling the 
term is probably the major reason for leaving a gap. It is extremely costly for host 
developing nations to collect and examine their domestic laws and policies. There are 
many reasons that explain these difficulties. First, many host developing countries are 
currently renovating and reforming their domestic laws. After Washington-consensus 
policies failed, many host developing nations learned that market-oriented rules and 
regulations work only if there are appropriate domestic institutions. Particularly, they 
realized that establishing the “appropriate economic and legal policies”45 (i.e. policies that 
reflect local environment and social-political culture) is critical for the success of further 
economic development.46 Thus, many host countries are establishing their appropriate 
domestic economic and legal policies. Because the rules and regulations are in the process 
of reformation, it is difficult for negotiation teams to gather data and examine how these 
laws and policies will interact with TIS agreements. For instance, determining how 
domestic policies interact with MFN or NT clauses in a main text is challenging when 
domestic policies are evolving. The rules and regulations are frequently changing, and it 
is difficult to predict the legal consequences of inserting MFN or NT clauses in the text. 
Additionally, it is difficult to see which rules and regulations should be carved out from 
                                                          
 45. DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 229 (2008). Appropriate economic and legal policies refer to policies that are tailored to local 
environments or to the culture of a society. Because host developing nations are different from advanced 
countries in that they face many constraints and challenges, institutions that performed well in the advanced 
countries may not work as well in developing nations. Host developing nations do not require an extensive set 
of institutional reforms. Rather, they need to evaluate their institutions and find “appropriate” institutional 
arrangements to further their growth. Id. See also Dani Rodrik, Second-Best Institutions, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 
100, 100–04 (2008); DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX 171 (2011); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004). 
 46. Law and development studies have been rapidly growing for the past few years. However, there is no 
consensus as to what this field is or whether it is an academic field at all. Different scholars have different answers 
to these questions. Some focus on formal institutions, describing how enforcement of contracts or an independent 
judiciary protects investors and improve economic growth in developing nations. Others have not focused on 
economic development, but instead on social development such as democracy or freedom. See DAVID TRUBEK, 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 50 YEARS ON, INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2161899. See also DAVID TRUBEK & ALVAROS SANTOS, 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (2006); Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. 
Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 
895 (2008); Yong S. Lee, Call for a New Analytical Model for Law and Development, 8 L. & DEV. REV. 1, 1 
(2015) (establishing foundational work for the development of the analytical law and development model, or 
“ADM”); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & MARIANA M. PRADO, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT (2014). 
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the main text by listing in the nonconforming measures list. They presumably want the 
appropriate economic and legal policies to be carved out from the text, but they are simply 
not ready because it is in the middle of the reform process. 
Second, host developing nations face extreme difficulties in obtaining cooperation 
from other line ministries.47 Of course, there are exceptions when the negotiation team has 
strong political power and is prioritized, such as the United States Trade Representative, 
which is part of the executive office of the President. However, most host developing 
nations experience difficulties in cooperating with line ministries, especially with respect 
to collecting measures for the preparation of a schedule of commitments or a 
nonconforming measures list. For instance, a negotiation team under a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or Trade may send a request to the Ministry of Land to prepare a schedule of 
commitments with respect to land measures because it has no expertise in this area. 
However, in many cases, a Ministry of Land frequently postpones submitting the analysis 
of the domestic measures to the negotiation team because such preparation is simply not 
its principal function. Thus, even if the analyses of the domestic measures are easily 
obtainable by line ministries, administrative inefficiencies and lack of cooperation 
between ministries may become a big hurdle to listing the measures in the reservation list. 
Lastly, lack of expertise and low negotiation skills are also significant factors that 
influence the cost of filling the terms. In fact, it is difficult for host developing nations to 
carve out appropriate laws in the main text because most home countries negotiate with 
the model treaty template, aiming at a high level of market opening and liberalization. 
They seek to persuade host nations not to deviate from any terms of the model treaty, 
requesting them to carve out as little as possible. Host countries have little bargaining 
power or negotiation skills to modify the terms of the model treaty and, thus, tend to merely 
accept most of its terms.48 It is well known that most ratified services and investment 
agreements have an extremely similar appearance, being almost identical to the terms in 
the model treaty. 
Surprisingly, for most of the readers of this Article, negotiators with expertise from 
home nations frequently hold question-and-answer sessions (“Q&A sessions”) parallel to 
main investment negotiations.49 This shows a dramatic inequality of bargaining power 
between negotiating parties. The Q&A sessions usually consist of discussions about the 
meanings of provisions or articles and the consequences of adopting them. The lecturers–
usually the negotiators from home-developed countries–would have the maximum amount 
of bargaining power depending on how they shape their Q&A sessions. This is probably 
                                                          
 47. There is a debate about whether to place trade representatives under a ministry, such as the ministry of 
trade or foreign affairs, or as part of the executive office of the president. Many suggest host countries conduct a 
structural reform of the trade representative so that it becomes an independent entity under the executive office 
of the president. See, e.g., Gi H. Kim, The Change of Trade Negotiation Agency and Negotiation Power in Korea, 
37 KOR. TRADE REV. 69 (2012). 
 48. Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development, and Integration: Innovative Path for BIT Practice, 17 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 299, 302–04 (2014). 
 49. Bilateral or multilateral negotiation of investment treaties in the real world involves more dramatic 
inequality of bargaining power than anyone could expect. Negotiators from host countries ask questions during 
breaks, and home countries’ negotiating partners answer their questions. Moreover, most negotiators from host 
countries handle the majority of ongoing investment treaties, so they do not have sufficient time to analyze or 
prepare the text of treaties. They are busy participating in negotiations, and therefore can accumulate expertise 
only by diligently participating in Q&A sessions and asking peers from home countries questions. 
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why all services and investment agreements look the same. Negotiators simply copy and 
paste the treaty from a previously concluded text because they have no expertise in 
modifying the terms.50 
What about the probability of the loss (P)? It is difficult to tell whether a probability 
of loss is high or low. There are unlimited numbers of variables to consider, such as the 
frequency that a host country exercises the domestic measures, the possibilities of a 
settlement before a lawsuit, and the possibilities of changes in rules and regulations in the 
near future. Unlimited variables make it difficult for us to definitely say that P should be 
high or low. 
What about a joint loss (L)? Incomplete provisions have a mixed effect for both 
negotiating partners. Incomplete provisions definitely have a negative effect on both 
foreign investors in a home state and on host countries, as they reduce transparency and 
predictability for foreign investors. For instance, if the treaty is ratified without any 
schedule of commitments, foreign investors cannot identify the legally permitted 
boundaries of investments. Therefore, investors cannot make confident investments, 
rendering it difficult for a host developing country to attract foreign investment.51 
On the other hand, incomplete provisions can be beneficial to some countries if those 
countries are not ready to sign treaties. Incomplete provisions and a single renegotiation 
clause allow host developing nations to maintain a high level of market protection for their 
domestic policies and comply with the main text of the TIS agreements, all while avoiding 
obligations to renovate or establish new rules. This gives the countries additional time and 
flexibility to adjust to and prepare for new market openings and liberalization moves. 
It is difficult to figure out the exact quantitative numbers that constitute P, L, and C, 
since treaties are assumed to be incomplete contracts with incomplete information. There 
are an unlimited number of factors to consider, and the mixed effect of incomplete 
provisions makes it even more difficult to analyze the decision-making process of the 
parties concerned. 
C. The Problems Related to Incomplete Provisions: Opportunistic Behavior 
As noted, gaps in contracts raise the problem of opportunistic behavior.52 A party 
that has the flexibility to adjust its performance in the future as conditions change will 
always choose the best alternative option for itself, even though the option may not be the 
best for both parties.53 
In this regard, a country may choose to behave opportunistically when conditions 
change after ratification of a treaty. To be specific, they might not comply with the 
renegotiation clause by avoiding renegotiating the incomplete provisions as their 
                                                          
 50. Huaqun, supra note 48, at 302–04. 
 51. See generally U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., TRANSPARENCY: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II (2012). The report contains comprehensive analysis of how 
international investment agreements (“IIAs”) could enhance transparency and predictability for investors. The 
report examines: (1) the way in which traditional transparency issues have been addressed in IIAs since 2004; 
(2) the emergence of investor responsibilities as a consideration within transparency issues; and (3) the 
introduction of a transparency dimension into investor-State dispute settlement. Id.  
 52. Aceves, supra note 39, at 1009. 
 53. SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 76; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989). 
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conditions change after ratification. Just as in the example of the seller with a warranty, 
India or Singapore might choose not to complete the agreement and argue that it did its 
best, since they put the term “shall endeavor” to fix incomplete provisions in their TIS 
agreement. 
In addition to the problems of avoiding and postponing renegotiation, the possibility 
for opportunism arises once renegotiation begins. The parties may opportunistically drag 
out the selection of the agenda for the renegotiation. Generally, the renegotiation requires 
the parties to select agendas based on the issues in the TIS agreements that need to be 
renegotiated. For example, a party may view amending coverage of a MFN clause as a 
priority, while the other negotiating partner may prefer to insert the missing schedules of 
commitments, or complete the unfinished schedules or nonconforming measures list. The 
parties usually debate over establishing the agenda for the renegotiation, and many 
negotiating partners intentionally drag out the process to procrastinate on the correction of 
gaps. 
Why do many nations act opportunistically to postpone the renegotiation? Many 
nations have various reasons to act opportunistically after ratification of a treaty.54 As 
noted above, they may opportunistically stick to the previously concluded TIS agreements 
by postponing the renegotiation. Many nations sign amended TIS agreements to commit 
to higher liberalization. However, if the country still believed that it was not ready for the 
market opening and services liberalization, it could simply procrastinate on the 
renegotiation and enjoy the lesser degree of liberalization. If countries fail to insert 
anything in the agreement under negotiation and instead just leave the agreement blank 
with a renegotiation clause, there is no change in the degree of liberalization between 
negotiating partners. In turn, a party could enjoy a less stringent obligation to protect 
foreign investors by maintaining the less liberalized agreement that they have previously 
signed with negotiating partners. 
Likewise, countries could opportunistically postpone the renegotiation to maintain 
their protectionist policies derived from the vague and unfinished nonconforming 
measures list. In the example of unfinished nonconforming measures in the JSEPA, 
Singapore wanted to carve out its privatization policies but did not stipulate the legal 
citation and source of the measure in the non-conforming measure list. In fact, any 
privatization rules and regulations in all different sectors of the economy could arguably 
be carved out from the main text. The Singaporean government could enjoy this advantage 
by not specifying the nonconforming measures, while Japanese investors would face 
difficulties identifying the boundaries of their investment projects. 
The cost of examining and finding domestic laws and policies may remain high even 
after ratification of treaties, and thus parties may decide not to initiate the task. Because of 
ongoing legal reforms, many nations, especially host developing nations, face extreme 
difficulties identifying the domestic laws and policies that will be affected by the TIS 
agreement. In this respect, these countries would have an incentive to wait and postpone 
the renegotiation until they are certain which domestic measures and economic sectors will 
                                                          
 54. GUZMAN, supra note 41, at 135. Countries frequently resist drafting detailed and comprehensive 
obligations because, although such obligations increase credibility and lead to higher compliance rates, they also 
increase the penalties the countries face if they violate the agreement. Id. The countries take this cost into account 
when drafting the agreements. Id. 
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be affected by the TIS agreement, and until they know what the legal consequences will 
be. Thereafter, they may be willing to produce complete forms of the agreement by 
reducing incomplete provisions in the renegotiation phase. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”) is a proposed FTA 
between the ten member states of the ASEAN and the six states with which ASEAN has 
existing FTAs (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand). RCEP 
negotiations were formally launched in November 2012 at the ASEAN Summit in 
Cambodia, and the tenth round of negotiations finished in South Korea in early October 
2015. 
RCEP members originally agreed to conclude all the negotiations by the end of 
2015, but they failed to do so.55 They recently scheduled another five rounds of 
negotiations by the end of 2016 to conclude the agreement. Among the many working 
groups in the negotiation, the TIS working group showed the slowest progress. In fact, 
they have not agreed to any terms of the main text. Over the last four years, they have 
agreed on nothing. The member states have only a few months left to conclude the RCEP. 
Could they possibly complete the treaty within a few months? Probably not. They will 
probably conclude it with many incomplete provisions. This Article strongly suggests that 
member states agree on establishing a strict renegotiation clause to repeatedly monitor and 
complete the treaty. In that way, we can expect a more complete treaty that reduces its 
transaction cost. 
                                                          
 55. Deborah Elms, RCEP Shifts Into a New Gear?, ASIAN TRADE CENTRE: TALKING TRADE BLOG (Aug. 6, 
2015), http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/2015/8/6/rcep-shifts-into-a-new-gear (“The original 
intention was to complete the agreement by the end of [2015]. The timing had been chosen to link up RCEP with 
the introduction of the ASEAN Economic Community. However, when RCEP ministers met in Kuala Lumpur 
last month, they finally agreed that closure in 2015 was not possible.”). 
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